• Addressing the individual error may prevent the person repeating the same error, whereas addressing latent errors and contributing human factors may prevent an entire organization from making the error again.
• In the NHS, incident reporting systems are a form of voluntary staff-led error data collection and collation.
• Root cause analysis is a systematic process whereby the factors that contribute to an incident are identified and learned from. tend to be person/individual related or immediate equipment failures. Examples include an anaesthetist administering an incorrect drug dose to a patient or not turning on the oxygen flow for pre-oxygenation in a rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia. Active errors are usually picked up quickly at the time of the incident and therefore more easily identified. Latent errors occur at the 'blunt end' of health care. They do not directly cause the error and occur upstream of the event. These errors are wide ranging-the building/room layout, organizational processes, human resources, equipment failure, or medication error. These errors tend to be 'systems' related. They are the factors that have contributed to the event. [8] [9] [10] For example, many drugs have similar packaging (see Fig. 2 ), and the wrong drug or concentration could easily be administered. Some pumps have multiple steps to their programming, making it difficult to check the correct data have been entered. An example of a human resource error is not enough anaesthetists available to attend a crisis in another theatre during a normal working day. Latent errors can lie dormant for a long period of time before a situation arises that leads to the error being identified. There has been extensive investment in latent error reduction in many high-risk industries, with human factors engineering playing an important role.
To use an analogy, 'active failures are like mosquitoes. They can be swatted one by one, but they still keep coming. The best remedies are to create more effective defences and to drain the swamps in which they breed. The swamps, in this case, are the ever present latent conditions.' 11 
Executive errors, slips and lapses
An executive error is an active error occurring at an individual level. A task broadly has two stages-the planning phase and the action phase. An executive error occurs when an intended outcome is not achieved because of a deficit in the actions carried out. 8 Executive errors can be further divided into slips and lapses.
Slips are due to attentional failures, usually when undertaking familiar tasks. Familiar tasks have usually been undertaken many times previously and are almost an automatic behaviour, requiring little conscious effort 3, 8, 12 . A slip can take the form of intrusions where you are thinking about the management of another difficult case ahead and, for example, inadvertently draw up ephedrine into the intended metaraminol syringe. Slips tend to happen with familiar skill-based tasks. Lapses are due to memory failures. The tasks involved tend to be complex or have multiple steps, 8, 12 e.g. forgetting to flush the central venous catheter with 0.9% saline before inserting it or forgetting to give surgical antibiotic prophylaxis prior to making an incision (see Fig. 3 ). before execution of the task and is termed as a mistake. Planning relies on thought processes, and it applies largely to unfamiliar tasks. It is a conscious effort and requires more focus and energy than automatic familiar tasks. Problem solving is required to formulate a plan, and there are three common cognitive tools used to facilitate the process: knowledge based, rule application, and a mental model. 8, 12 Knowledge-based mistakes are generated by lack of facts related to the problem. 8, 9, 12 For example, suxamethomium can trigger malignant hyperthermia; and patients with diabetes can have gastric autonomic neuropathy, increasing the risk of acid reflux and aspiration. Rule application concerns the use of a set of learned guidelines. Mistakes can occur in the misapplication of a 'good' rule, e.g. giving a beta-blocker to a patient with fast atrial fibrillation to control the heart rate, but the patient has asthma. Using the 'wrong' rule also causes mistakes, 8 e.g. using the pneumonia guidelines to treat a patient with pulmonary embolus. Mental models are psychological representations of a situation. We often rely on previous experience when encountering a new situation and tend to use a mental model that best fits when we previously felt in control. However, this may not be the reality of the situation. 8 For example, a general anaesthetic is administered to an obstetric patient because of inadequate epidural anaesthesia for urgent Caesarean section. The patient becomes hypotensive and is resuscitated with i.v. fluids. Previous experience has been of obstetric hypotension caused by maternal haemorrhage, and aggressive blood transfusion is commenced. The obstetricians have achieved haemostasis, but the mental model persists and further fluids and blood products are given for presumed occult blood loss. The blood pressure remains low and the oxygen saturations drop as fluid overload manifests. The mental model has falsely reassured the anaesthetist who has overlooked or dismissed other causes of hypotension, such as a 'high' regional block. Mental models should not be relied upon and should be frequently re-evaluated.
As an anaesthetist progresses through his/her career, the likelihood of particular error types changes. In the early stages of a doctor's career, knowledge-based errors are more likely. As the novice advances and acquires his/her basic competencies his/her practice is guided by a basic set of rules, hence rulebased error usually occurs at this point. As an anaesthetic consultant, the majority of activities have become automatic skills, and slips and lapses can creep in. 8 
Violations
Slips, lapses, and mistakes are unintentional behaviours that may lead to patient harm. Violations differ as they are deliberate acts that deviate from the accepted guidelines of safe practice. In some rare instances, they are malevolent acts, where staff deliberately cause harm to patients, equipment, or other staff members. However, the majority of violations are committed with the intention of making a task easier or quicker, despite falling outside the safety guidelines. Such 'shortcuts' may on the surface seem to be a better trade-off between efficiency and risk but may cause patient harm. Continued violation of a safety protocol at an individual or department level will lead to a bare minimum safety margin, where serious harm could occur. 8 An example would be preoperative assessment of elective cases in the anaesthetic room. This would be time saving but would need to be balanced against the risk of pressure to proceed with surgery, even with insufficient investigations. In most occasions, all required information will be available and anaesthesia will proceed safely.
Team-working errors
Team-working errors occur with poor interaction within the multi-professional theatre team. Key areas of potential poor performance include crisis resource management (CRM), leadership, situational awareness, and task prioritization and allocation. 4, 11, 13, 14 Slips, lapses, and mistakes are all human errors, and as humans we are not infallible. Often we hear about an incident and think how easily that could have happened to any of us. By altering the environment or circumstances surrounding an incident we can minimize future errors. Human factors influence the way we behave and interact at work. These factors include our work environment, the organizational structure, remit of our job, and our personal traits. By looking into latent problems within a system and then placing safeguards, we can minimize active/human errors. This is the basis of human factors engineering. 5, 11 There are many latent errors and human factors that can lead to patient harm. Some of the common safeguards implemented in the theatre environment are:
• Active errors from the individual can be minimized by the use of checklists, briefings, guidelines, structured handovers, read backs, and double checks, 'Do not enter-anaesthesia in progress' signs, and simulation training (see Table 1 ).
• Latent errors within a system can be minimized by automated systems, standardization of equipment and drugs, and optimal equipment design with forced functions (i.e. equipment or systems that only allow specific standardized options to minimize error) (see Table 2 ).
Error within complex systems
No department is error proof. Reason proposed the 'Swiss Cheese' model to describe the trajectory of an error (see Fig. 4 ). 9 Multiple safeguards are put in place to avoid errors in a system. Each layer of protection will have an area of weakness, representing a hole in the defence. With multiple layers, even if an error breaches one layer, the next layer will catch the error before it causes patient harm. This model can be 100% effective in a static environment, but the NHS is a complex dynamic system with multiple 'moving' layers of protection, thus at some point the 'holes' in each layer can align, allowing a straight path to patient harm. There are, however, limitations to the 'Swiss Cheese' model in that it implies linear determinism. While that may be true in some industries such as nuclear and aviation, in health care it seldom is, as events rarely unfold in a single straightforward pattern, and are usually much more complicated and interrelated. 3, 8, 12 A comparably complex situation to health care is in the prediction of extreme weather events. It is not always possible to predict the occurrence of a severe hurricane or flood, as there are numerous factors that interplay to lead to one, but once one has occurred, the factors leading up to it can be analysed in retrospect in great detail. Error theory is constantly evolving. Suggested theories and solutions are more applicable to a static environment; however, health care is a dynamic environment. An expanding population, with increasing levels of co-morbidity, coupled with demand outstripping resources, means the health care environment will only get more complex over time. Kinnear proposed a different approach accepting the fluidity of the health care environment and focusing on our innate ability to problem solve through resilience engineering. 16 This is examining what works well in this challenging environment, in addition to went wrong. Resilience engineering involves building a flexible organization that anticipates the dynamic nature of errors and continually revises risk models to reduce errors before they occur.
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Incident reporting systems
Errors will occur within every health care system. It is important that these errors are identified and lessons drawn from these cases to improve patient safety. Incident reporting systems (IRS) collect error data with the aim of facilitating learning and improving patient safety. They are passive processes where data are voluntarily reported by staff on the front line. Voluntary incident reporting is highly variable and does not truly reflect the incidence of errors, which are generally underreported within health care. However, these passive systems are relatively inexpensive and empower staff to identify and learn from error. If lessons are appropriately disseminated to the right people, the required changes can be made to prevent recurrence. Increased reporting can be encouraged with an open 'fair blame' culture ensuring timely feedback and improvements. 7, 14 A 'fair blame' culture achieves a balance of openly investigating the factors leading up to an incident and our individual responsibility and behaviour as health care professionals to maintain good practice and safety. In the UK, 75% Monitors with visual data and audio data (including pulse oximetry saturation percentage and tone). Monitor display arranged so that it is easy to see basic vital measurements. Target-controlled infusion (TCI) pumps that are easy to programme and review data before proceeding. Giving pre-programmed options of TCI protocols, e.g. Marsh and Minto models. PCA pumps with preset standardized programmes.
Error and root cause analysis of Trusts use the Datix web-based software programme for incident reporting. Once reported, the process of learning and improving patient safety begins with root cause analysis (RCA). There are two general approaches to error investigation: person based and system based. The person-based approach focuses directly on the unsafe act committed by the person causing the incident and implies that the error is specific to that individual, separating the incident from the latent errors and human factors contributing to it. Unfortunately, the person-based approach is prevalent throughout many organizations. 8 With this approach, it is easier to blame an individual for his/her carelessness, inattention, recklessness, or lack of education. This tends to lead to a 'naming, blaming and shaming' culture, where if a similar circumstance were to occur again, the likelihood is that the same error would happen. In addition, the morale and confidence of the individuals involved may be permanently damaged. This is not an effective approach to error reduction in health care. The Berwick Report (2013) on patient safety in the NHS stated we should 'abandon blame as a tool'. 17 The basic premise in the system-based approach is that humans are fallible and errors are expected, even in the best organizations.
The systems-based approach is far more applicable to the NHS and considers the organizational processes and chain of events that lead to the error. Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not so much in the perversity of human nature as in the 'upstream' systemic factors. 11 Countermeasures are based on the assumption that though we cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work. RCA examines both aspects, but with particular emphasis on the systems-based approach. 8 
Root cause analysis
RCA is the structured, thorough investigation of a patient safety incident to determine the underlying causes and contributing factors, and then analyse these to draw out any learning points. 7 The learning points can be actioned to reduce the chance of the same or similar incident reoccurring. The Berwick Report stated as its main objective regarding patient safety, 'A promise to learn-a commitment to act: improving the safety of patients in England'. 17 The most widely adopted RCA template is from the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), which is detailed below. The process of RCA can be broken down into seven steps 18 (see Fig. 5 ).
Getting started
Gathering and mapping the information Identifying care and service delivery problems
Generating recommendations and solutions
Analysing the information -identifying contributory factors
Implementing solutions
Writing the RCA report The RCA investigation process
Getting started
To conduct an RCA, the incident must be categorized into level of harm, and an appropriate team should be assembled.
• Level 1 -No harm ('near miss')/low harm/moderate harm. A concise investigation usually handled by one local person, comprising a one-page summary.
• Level 2 -Severe harm or death. A comprehensive investigation, an in-depth assessment requiring a multidisciplinary team, which was not involved in the incident, or in the locality or directorate. There may be expert opinion sought.
• Level 3 -Severe harm, death, or public interest. As above, plus incidents of public interest or notifiable serious incidents (e.g. never events). These investigations are carried out by investigators external to the organization.
• The RCA team will routinely comprise a person trained in RCA, expert(s) in the incident field, an administrator, and a non-executive person (layperson or patient representative). 18 
Gathering and mapping the information
This step is about gathering all relevant facts surrounding the incident, avoiding opinions and other bias, e.g. the cultural bias 'this is the way it has always been done here'. The sources of information may include medical notes, staff statements, staff rotas (to ascertain staff numbers and skill mix), interviews, local and national policies, guidelines and inspection of equipment and drugs. Interviews can be challenging, highly emotive situations and individuals frequently have poor or altered event recollection. Group interviews suffer from hierarchical impedance whereby in a group of nurses and doctors, nurses may tend to speak up less frequently. Similarly, in a mixed group of junior doctors and consultants, the junior doctors may be less likely to express their concerns. It is important to have an experienced facilitator during group interviews with sensitive and concise questioning to obtain the facts.
All facts should be collected, including conflicting information. Expert opinion should be obtained. Data gaps should be identified and areas of good practice should be identified. This
Worked Example
Incident Report System (Datix) summary from theatres: Vascular surgery emergency open abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repair (failed endovascular aortic repair (EVAR)): Incorrect dose of heparin administered during surgery, patient suffered coagulopathy causing major surgical haemorrhage and cardiovascular instability requiring multiple blood product administrations. Patient admitted to intensive care unit postoperatively. Patient remains intubated with high oxygen requirements secondary to transfusion related acute lung injury (TRALI) and is receiving renal replacement therapy due to acute renal impairment. Anaesthetist who administered heparin had drawn up the incorrect dose. There are two different heparin vial concentrations in the anaesthetic room drug cupboard, heparin 100 units/ ml and 1000 units/ml. is a fact-finding mission at this stage of the RCA, and the temptation to analyse the data should be resisted. 17 The mapping of information can be recorded via a tabular timeline or a time/ person grid (see Worked example on the previous page). 18 
Identifying care and service delivery problems
Care delivery problems (CDPs) and service delivery problems (SDPs) include all acts of commission and omission. CDPs generally involve failure to monitor, observe, or act. 18 Examples of CDPs include:
• Not noticing the intravenous cannula has 'tissued' during total intravenous anaesthesia (TIVA).
• A trainee not escalating an ASA 4 cardiovascularly unstable vascular patient to the consultant before commencing anaesthesia.
• Not giving antibiotic prophylaxis to a patient undergoing hemiarthroplasty, with subsequent joint infection.
• Failure to ask for assistance when spinal anaesthesia has failed in a category 1 Caesarean section with a delay in delivery, resulting in a neonate with poor Apgar scores.
SDPs generally involve deficiencies in decisions, procedures, and systems. 17 Examples include:
• The decision to skip the team briefing in the morning before the list starts, which subsequently leads to a specific piece of surgical equipment not being available for a difficult case.
• Unintentionally using 2% instead of 1% propofol in the TIVA pump, causing cardiovascular instability in a patient.
• The administration of neat potassium chloride solution in a paediatric burette to an adult patient causing an unpredictable infusion rate, resulting in cardiac arrhythmias.
• Continued shortage of central venous catheters in the operating theatre area.
• Inadvertently giving local anaesthetics drugs intravenously, causing cardiovascular instability.
• Inadequate handover of septic patient, causing delay in treatment.
One tool to highlight CDPs and SDPs is called change analysis. The patient journey is mapped, what actually happened against what should have happened, and a list of CPDs and SDPs is generated. This can be done by the RCA team and by group discussion with the team involved in the incident. This process often has the advantage of raising issues not thought of by the RCA team. 18 
Analysing the information-identifying contributory factors and root causes
In order to get to the root cause of a CDP or an SDP, you must recognize the contributing factor leading to each problem. Contributing factors are any behaviour, commission, omission, or deficiency that sets the stage for an error to occur. Contributory factors can be more easily identified when using a framework; one common example is the contributory factors framework suggested by the NPSA, which can be depicted as a fishbone diagram (also known as an Ishikawa diagram) (see Fig.  6 ). 18 Consideration by the RCA team of all these aspects of contributory factors will lead to one point that had the greatest impact on that particular CDP or SDP. This is the root cause.
Frequently there is more than one CDP or SDP related to the incident and may well be more than one root cause. Another method used to analyse CDPs or SDPs is the '5 Whys' approach. This involves repeatedly asking why each part of an incident occurred to whittle down to the root cause. This may also help to identify sequence or procedural related root causes more readily. 18 
Worked Example
CDP: Failure to identify correct vial of heparin for vascular procedure by anaesthetic registrar, anaesthetic registrar failure to register, or read the heparin vial label correctly. Consultant failed to check the heparin concentration before administration. SDP: Two different concentrations of heparin available beside each other in the anaesthetic drug cupboard. Anaesthetic registrar had drawn up multiple drugs over short space of time, while on phone to haematology department. 
Generating recommendations and solutions
Solutions give the impression of permanent, easily achieved prevention of patient safety incidents. In reality, the system we work in requires a more complex approach. Solutions can be thought of in terms of the following:
• Human actions, e.g. teamwork, handovers, and skills.
• Administrative actions, e.g. procedures, policies, guidelines, training, and supervision • Physical actions, e.g. similar product packaging changed and equipment with forced functions. 18 Solutions with a large impact within an entire organization are often more difficult to achieve than more localized ones. Therefore, solutions that work on both levels should be considered to achieve optimal safe working environments and practices (see Fig. 7 ). 18 Constructing a Pareto chart may be useful to focus interventions to gain maximum benefits. A Pareto chart is a combined bar and line graph, which indicates the reduction in an event occurrence relative to specific interventions. Solutions should be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely) and have a minimal impact on other beneficial procedures and resources. 18 Finally, these solutions should be put into action.
Implementing solutions
Implementing a solution is an ongoing dynamic process involving communication, dissemination, diffusion, adoption, spread, and sustainability. An action plan must be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely (SMART). A common template used is an Action Plan Document (see Worked example on the next page). This document encourages the consideration of common factors required for a successful solution implementation.
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A successful solution implementation is evidenced by measurement of the intended effect. This is akin to a quality improvement project where the Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) cycle continuously assesses and refines the value of the activity. 
Writing the report
There are report templates (concise, comprehensive, and external) on the NPSA website; however, each trust will have its own modified template. It is important when analysing investigation findings to be aware of, and try to avoid, hindsight bias and outcome bias. Hindsight bias is the tendency for people with the 'benefit of hindsight' to falsely believe, once all the facts become clear, that the actions that should have been taken to prevent an incident seem obvious, or that they could have predicted the outcome of the event. 18 Outcome bias is the tendency to judge a past decision or action by its success or failure, instead of based on the quality of the decision made at the time.
No decision maker knows for sure whether or not the future will turn out for the best following any decision they make. Individuals whose judgements are influenced by outcome bias can hold decision makers responsible for events beyond their
Worked Example
AcƟon Plan Document:
Error and root cause analysis control. 18 Similarly, if an incident leads to death it is often considered very differently and critically, compared with an incident that results in no harm, even where the incident or error is exactly the same. When people are judged one way when the outcome is good, and another when the outcome is poor, accountability levels become inconsistent and unfair. To avoid the influence of outcome bias, one should evaluate the decision or action taken at the time it was taken, and given what was known or going on at that time, irrespective of the successful or failed outcome. When producing the report, it is important to bear in mind which differing groups will have access to and be reading the report. This may include clinical staff, patient(s) involved and their relatives, hospital patient safety committee, hospital board, Department of Health, coroners, solicitors, general public, and media. It is therefore important to set the right tone, format, and style for all the interested parties. The report must be clear, concise, logical, and show an open and fair approach, and be in the third person. The report should be anonymized and avoid negative or inflammatory descriptors. It is best to record facts and reasoned conclusions, not opinions and assumptions. Link care and service delivery problems with their root cause and then demonstrate the shared learning derived from that. 18 The RCA report must be completed within 60 days of identification of the incident by the patient safety team.
Conclusion
'Patient safety problems exist throughout the NHS' 17 and within every health care system around the world. Errors can be active individual based or latent system based. IRS allows Trusts and the Department of Health to keep track of the numbers and types of errors through voluntary reporting by staff members. RCA is a structured seven-step approach to learning from these errors, embracing an open but 'fair blame' learning process.
Only by understanding the mechanisms and circumstances by which errors occur, and embracing an open culture to learn from them, can we provide safe and effective patient care.
Hierarchy of effectiveness
Degree of difficulty
Stronger Actions
Change cultural approach Architectural / physical plant or equipment changes
Standardize and usability testing of equipment or care plans
Simplify the process and remove unnecessary steps
Weaker Actions
Double checks
Warnings and labels New procedure/policy
Re-training
Moderately Strong Actions
Effective use of skill mix
Eliminate look and sound-a-likes Eliminate / reduce distractions Checklist / cognitive aids 
Worked Example
The amalgamation of the entire RCA, ensuring tone, language, and data, are suitable for each group of people who may be reading it. The report should include the analysis, all recommendations and actions with time frames, and identified personnel who will be responsible for ensuring compliance.
To err is human, to cover up is unforgivable, to fail to learn is inexcusable. 19 
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